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DO PIGS NEED WINGS? INTRODUCTORY
THOUGHTS ON LAW REVIEWS, ERRORS,
AND THE COASE THEOREM
STEMHEN CALKISt
Ever since shepherd children stumbled upon the Dead Sea
Scrolls, a small group of scholars controlled access to these writ-
ings. These scholars painstakingly edited and published so far
about half the historic texts. Scholars not numbered among the
select few complained of the arrogance implicit in limiting access
to the original materials.
Now the critics have their chance. In late 1991 the Biblical
Archaeology Society published a "facsimile edition" of the pre-
viously unpublished scrolls. Professor Robert H. Eisenman, co-
editor of the new edition, boasted that this was 'the last stage
in breaking the monopoly' of authorized editors over the scroll
texts."' One of those authorized editors responded that it would
be 'presumably immoral and unethical' for scholars to work
with the newly released texts until he and his colleagues had
translated them. He forecast shoddy research. 2 Professor Eisenman
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author
thanks Martin Adelman, Alan Goodman, and Stephen Schulman for reviewing
a draft of this introduction, Anna Maiuri and Cathleen Cassisa for research
assistance, and especially John Dolan for his many helpful suggestions. Respon-
sibility for error remains with the author.
1. Suplee, Book to Open Access to Dead Sea Scrolls; Biblical Society Will
Issue Facsimile Edition of Unpublished Texts, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1991, at
Al, col. 2.
2. "Shoddy research" were the words used to paraphrase the comments
of Notre Dame Professor Eugene Ulrich. Wilford, Dead Sea Scrolls to Be
Published, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1991, at A7, col. 1.
'THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
was unconcerned: "Now we can let free competition determine
what the best scholarship is." 3
I. LAW REvIEws
Access to law review publication is the antithesis of access to
the Dead Sea Scrolls. Some wonder whether much law review
writing is worthwhile;4 no one argues that legal scholars are denied
adequate opportunity to offer thought to the world.' Scholars in
other disciplines envy the ease with which we publish, or, increas-
ingly, they join us in contributing to law reviews. No cartel doles
out information; free competition determines the best legal schol-
arship 6
3. Professor Robert M. Eisenman, quoted in Suplee, supra note 1.
4. "There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its
style. The other is its content." This classic attack is from Fred Rodell's Goodbye
to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38, 38 (1936), reprinted and supplemented, 48
VA. L. REv. 279 (1962). Although few if any have improved upon Rodell's work,
his themes are regularly explored. E.g., Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in
the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 1-ARv. L. REv. 926 (1990). Three of the
most noteworthy contributions are Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution".
The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1986), which laments the
proliferation and degradation of student-edited law reviews; Nowak, Woe Unto
You, Law Reviews! 27 Aiuz. L. REv. 317 (1985), which blames professors who
can not write and have nothing to say; and Austin, Footnotes as Product
Differentiation, 40 VANrD. L. REv. 1131 (1987), which satirically mocks footnotes
such as this one.
5. A charming and deservedly well-known discussion of the law review as
a democratic institution is Havighurst, Law Reviews and Legal Education, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 22 (1956); see also Martin, The Law Review Citadel: Rodell
Revisited, 71 IowA L. REv. 1093, 1097 (1986) (law reviews as forums for the
unknown); Vitiello, In Defense of Student-Run Law Reviews, 17 CumB. L. REv.
859, 872 (1987) (rejoicing that "the array of journals makes publication inevi-
table").
Dean Havighurst's discussion of this point is all the more apt because his
guess that few new reviews would be launched, Law Reviews and Legal Education,
51 Nw. U.L. REv. 22, 25 (1956), underestimated the incentives to publish that
his article catalogued. Reviews are even more open to a variety of articles than
suggested by their extraordinary number, moreover, because editorial boards
change annually. Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In
Response to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1122, 1127-28. Whereas
a faculty-edited review could be "captured" by a single view, student editors
change, and, because grades usually have a roll in the selection process, editorial
boards have trouble cloning themselves.
6. This is a somewhat naive view of the process. Articles in the Harvard
Law Review are more likely to be noticed than articles in "Podunk U's" review,
and, human nature being what it is, are more likely to be warmly received.
Rosenkranz, Law Review's Empire, 39 HAsniNsO L.J. 859, 917-18 (1988). Em-
[Vol. 38:1
INTRODUCTION
This tradition of legal scholarship is not without costs, how-
ever, not the least of which is the timber sacrificed to feed law
review presses. A more serious problem is the risk that the tidal
wave of writing may overwhelm the audience. Increasing numbers
of lawyers, judges, and academics respond by reading more selec-
tively or even by not reading at all.7 The sheer number of published
pirical studies repeatedly find that a relatively small number of journals account
for a disproportionately high number of citations by courts and journals. Mann,
The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMBmCS J. 400
(1986); Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FoUND.
REs. J. 227; Sirico & Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme
Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. RPv. 131 (1986). The direction of
causation is uncertain, however, because the more honored journals tend to
attract the more honored authors. A surprising number of leading articles,
moreover, are published in what some might regard as lesser law reviews. Richard
Mann's "judicial high impact group"-the twenty-three law reviews that ac-
counted for fifty per cent of judicial citations-included the following law reviews:
Baltimore, Gonzaga, Hofstra, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Southwestern, Syracuse, Texas Tech, and Wayne State. 26 JuRnnmxcs J. at 404.
Rankings by citations in law reviews follow more closely conventional guesses
about law school hierarchies, but even here there are exceptions. The "journal
high impact group" included Emory, Hastings, Hofstra, Miami, Southwestern,
the American Bar Association Journal, the Business Lawyer, and Judicature. Id.
at 402. A well-known list of the fifty most cited law review articles was dominated
by articles from the premier law review of very elite schools, but it also included
articles in the Indiana Law Journal, Law and Contemporary Problems, and the
Southwestern Law Review, and it would have included Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960), had it not been in an unindexed interdis-
ciplinary journal. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALiF. L.
Rnv. 1546, 1550-51 (1985).
Periodically the status quo is the subject of protest. Legal academics, and
especially those with unhappy experiences with student editors, cast covetous eyes
toward their colleagues elsewhere in the university and argue for peer-reviewed
law journals. Cramton, supra note 4, at 9-10 (future of student-edited reviews
"in doubt"). Many professors reportedly believe "that having students select the
scholarship that deserves publication is akin to letting the inmates run the
asylum." Rothfeld, A Lament: Too Few Interesting Law Articles, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1990, at Bi, col. 3. Change has come, however, not by the dethroning
of student-edited law reviews, but by the addition of faculty-edited law reviews
such as the Supreme Court Review, the Journal of Law and Economics, and the
Journal of Legal Studies. This development has diminished the clout of traditional
reviews, Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HAIv. L. REv. 761, 779-80 (1987), but more fundamental change is unlikely.
No leading school is likely to switch to a peer-edited review, because the current
system disproportionately benefits these schools' students, who can attract and
work with prominent authors and faculty. Faculty at elite schools benefit because
their "home" reviews are elite, and their articles are received relatively favorably
at other reviews in part because the authors are identified as being at an elite
school. E.g., Liebman & White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make
Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 387 (1989).
7. E.g., Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L.
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articles also virtually guarantees that some work will be dull and
some will contain error.
II. Posn's ARTICLE
In a recent issue, the Wayne Law Review published The Coase
Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly,' by Daniel Q. Posin, professor of
law at Tulane Law School. The piece was not dull. It was indeed
uncommonly bold, in that it declared the Coase Theorem-the
polestar of the law and economics movement-unequivocally wrong.
The centerpiece -of Posin's article was a variation of Professor
Coase's famous hypothetical relationship between a rancher and a
farmer. In Posin's hypothetical, the rancher can raise cattle or
ponies. Cattle fetch higher prices but stray onto the farmer's crops,
causing damage. Posin calculated that a rancher liable for damaged
crops would raise fewer cows than a rancher free from liability-
contrary, he asserted, to the Coase Theorem. Posin claimed his
hypothetical thus disproved the Coase Theorem, and he celebrated
the theorem's demise.
Let it never be said that Coaseans do not care. Swarms of
supporters repel assaults on the sainted Coase, and defenders
quickly manned the battlements against Posin. The Wayne Law
Review received unsolicited responses from Lloyd Cohen of IIT
Chicago Kent; Barry A. Currier and Jeffrey L. Harrison of Florida;
Gall L. Heriot of San Diego; Stephen Marks of Boston University;
and Stewart Schwab of Cornell; and, in response to invitations to
comment, from Gregory S. Crespi of SMU; Robin Paul Malloy
REv. 739 (professor confessing he reads fewer law review articles, and calling for
shorter pieces). Many argue that law review readership also has been diminished
by the perceived irrelevance of much that passes as law review scholarship. "We
do not need to worry about the consumers of law reviews because they really do
not exist. A few professors who author texts must read some of the articles, but
most volumes are purchased to decorate law school library shelves." Nowak,
supra note 4, at 321. As New York Court of Appeals Judge Judith Kaye wrote,
"Prominent law reviews are increasingly dedicated to abstract, theoretical subjects,
to federal constitutional law, and to federal law generally, and less and less to
practice and professional issues, and to the grist of state court dockets." Kaye,
One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 313,
319 (1989). Concern for law review readers is not new. In 1956 Dean Havighurst
made his classic observation that "[wlhereas most periodicals are published
primarily in order that they may be read, the law reviews are published primarily
in order that they may be written." Havighurst, supra note 5, at 24. For an
argument that law reviews are influential, even though not read, because they
may be consulted, see Liebman & White, supra note 6, at 398, and Martin,
supra note 5, at 1096-97.
8. 37 WAYN L. REv. 89 (1990).
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of Syracuse; and Thomas S. Ulen of Illinois. The writers disagree
about many Coasean issues; they are virtually unanimous, however,
in their criticism of Posin's article.
These responses, which the Law Review understandably felt
obligated to publish, are collected in this issue. Several responses
go well beyond a simple refutation of Posin. Also included here
is Posin's reply, in which he acknowledges that his solution to the
hypothetical was erroneous.9 Posin continues to insist that the
Coase Theorem is wrong, however, for reasons related to but
somewhat different from those set forth in his article.
III. THE CoAsE TIEoR M
An introduction to a set of articles about a theorem should
begin with the theorem. This beginning is more difficult than the
uninitiated might think because Coase's famous article, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost,'0 never set forth a theorem as such. 1 To this
day, scholars talk confidently about the Coase Theorem yet mean
different things. Compare the versions in three leading texts. First,
Judge Posner's celebrated law and economics book states the
theorem as follows: "111f transactions are costless, the initial
assignment of a property right will not determine the ultimate use
of the property."' 2 Professor Polinsky, who authored another
celebrated law and economics book, disagrees: "If there are zero
transactions costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of
9. Posin, Bringing Home the Bacon: A Response to Critics, 38 WAYNE
L. REv. 107 (1991). Readers should know that the Law Review, per agreement
with Posin, showed his reply to none of the responders-but, then, Posin did
not see a copy of this introduction.
10. 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Coase's article may be the most cited
economics work of our time. Cheung, Ronald Harry Coase, 1 THM NEw PAL-
GRAvE: A DICTiONARY OF EcONoMIcs 455, 456 (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P.
Newman eds. 1987). The article is included in the standard lists of the "greatest"
and most cited law review articles. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1540, 1546 & n.33
(citing GREAT AMRIcAN LAW REvmws (R. Berring ed. 1984)).
11. An approximation of what came to be known as "the Theorem" is
given in The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. at 8: "the ultimate result
(which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position
if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost," but Coase credited
George Stigler with the phrase "Coase Theorem" and with the theorem's original
formulation. R. CoAsE, THE FnrM, TH MARKET, AND TH3E LAw 157-58 (1988)
quoting G. STOLER, THE THEoRY oF PRIcE 113 (3d ed. 1966). Although Stigler
discussed only The Problem of Social Cost and the theorem is closely associated
with that work, much of the underlying thinking can be seen in Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission' 2 J.L. & ECON. 25 (1959). See R. COASE,
Tm FnaM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 157-58.
12. R. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (3d ed. 1986).
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the choice of legal rule." 13 Professor Cooter, who wrote the
relevant entry in the monumental The New Palgrave: A Dictionary
of Economics, sets forth three versions: "[T]he initial allocation
of legal entitlements does not matter from an efficiency perspective
[1] so long as they can be freely exchanged," or, "[2] so long as
the transactions costs of exchange are nil," or, "[3] so long as
they can be exchanged in a perfectly competitive market.' ' 14
Many writers distinguish between the theorem's "efficiency
claim" and its "invariance claim." For instance, Professor Zerbe's
version of the theorem is as follows: "In a world of zero trans-
actions costs, the allocation of resources will be [1] efficient, and
[2] invariant with respect to legal rules of liability, income effects
aside.' ' 5 Professor Cooter, among others, finds "general agree-
ment that the invariance version is untenable.' 6 Others disagree. 7
For that matter, while some leading scholars consider the Coase
Theorem an empirically testable prediction,' others call it merely
an interesting tautology. 19
13. A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 12 (2d ed.
1989).
14. Cooter, Coase Theorem, in I THE NEw PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
EcoNoMIcs 457 (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman eds. 1987). Yet another
version is offered by Stigler, whom Coase credited with the theorem's first
formulation: "[Uinder perfect competition private and social costs will be equal."
Stigler, supra note 11, at 113.
15. Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost in Retrospect, 2 REs. L. & ECON.
83, 84 (1980). Professor Regan is closely associated with this distinction. Regan,
The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1972). Professor
Donohue finds a third Coasean rule, a "distributional prediction [that] asserts
that under certain circumstances the assignment of the initial legal entitlement
will not affect the distribution of wealth." Donohue, Diverting the Coasean
River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549,
550 n.3 (1989).
16. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1982); accord
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1215 n.12 (1991) ("What Coase (and his followers) clearly meant, however,
was that, absent transaction costs, an equally efficient point would be reached
regardless of starting points.") (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
17. E.g., Donohue, supra note 15, at 550 n.3.
18. E.g., id. (reviewing others' experimental studies and presenting one
which found that people may not bargain to efficient outcomes). Schwab has
observed that Coase appeared to treat his theorem as testable, which makes it
more a prediction than a theorem, because "theorems are simply interesting
tautologies." Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists
Do Not, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 1171, 1176 (1989). Perhaps the best known real-world
empirical test of Coase's prediction is Ellickson's, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986);
[Vol. 38:1
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Given these disparate views, it is not surprising that even
scholarly supporters of the Coase Theorem rely on versions of it
to support widely different policy recommendations. Judge Posner
relies on the Coase Theorem to recommend giving legal rights to
the parties that value them most (the parties who eventually would
enjoy the right in a Coasean world). 20 Professor Polinsky derives
a somewhat different precept: "[T]he preferred legal rule is the
rule that minimizes the effects of transaction costs." ' 21 Skeptics of
governmental intervention regularly cite Coase, 22 but governmental
activists also cite him.23 Activists reason in part that because the
Coasean process will take care of efficiency, one might as well
award entitlements to the poor, who are likely to benefit dispro-
portionately. 24
Confusion at the highest scholarly level regarding the Coase
Theorem's meaning, validity, and teaching does not commend this
most celebrated of law review articles to the courts.25 To be sure,
the best known simulations Hoffman and Spitzer's, e.g., Coursey, Hoffman &
Spitzer, Fear and Loathing in the Coase Theorem: Experimental Tests Involving
Physical Discomfort, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1987).
19. E.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1988). Cooter argues that every
version of the theorem "is probably false or a mere tautology" that turns on an
inflated definition of transaction costs. Cooter, supra note 14, at 458-59. As this
implies, scholars use widely differing meanings of "transactions costs." Schlag,
The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1661, 1675-72 (1989)
(reviewing alternative meanings); see also Ellickson, The Case for Coase and
Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989) (describing multiple kinds of
transaction costs).
20. R. PosNER, supra note 12, at 45. My reference to a "Coasean world"
is for convenience. In fact, Coase recognized that transactions costs are often
high.
21. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 13, at 13.
22. E.g., Posin, supra note 8, at 19 (collecting authorities).
23. E.g., B. AcKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AERICAN LAw 54 (1984); Gjer-
dingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to Modern Legal
Thought, 35 BurrALo L. REv. 871 (1986). For an impassioned argument that the
"Coase Theorem has been captured unfairly by the political right, see SchIag, An
Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View from
the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919.
24. See Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL
L. REv. 783 (1990); Schwab, supra note 18, at 1195-96. For a variation of this,
see Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE
L.J. 1211 (1991), which argues that society is alvays at or approaching Pareto
efficiency, so distributional analysis is inevitable.
25. In contrast, confusion may have increased frequency of citation by
scholars, or so Zerbe argues: "The many insights, the timing, and the lack of
1991]
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commentators observe that courts "increasingly" cite the theo-
rem,26 which is unsurprising given the number of law and econom-
ics devotees who have donned judicial robes. Nonetheless, opinions
cite it only about twice a year. 27
Another reason why courts cite the Coase Theorem only rarely
is that, in each of its versions, it is inherently counter-intuitive. 2
The central teaching of the theorem is that rights are reciprocal: 29
my "right" to breathe clean air impinges upon your "right" to
pollute just as surely as your pollution fouls my air. George Stigler
observed that Coase taught us "what of course we should already
have known"1 0-but we did not. The world of Coasean thinking
is a world into which anyone can enter but in which almost no
one resides. Entering that world is somewhat akin to putting on
three-dimensional spectacles: one does it deliberately, is disoriented
clarity combine to make 'The Problem of Social Cost' a bench-mark article.
Since it is unclear, critics and advocates have been able to read into Coase's
work what they wished to support or criticize." Zerbe, supra note 15, at 84.
26. The usual citation is to White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for
the Common Man, 72 IowA L. REv. 577, 578 (1987) ("courts show a growing
interest in Coase's arguments").
27. The Problem of Social Cost was virtually ignored by the courts until
1979. In the nineteen years from 1960 through 1978, it was cited in only five
opinions. In the thirteen-plus years since 1978, it has been cited in twenty-six
opinions. It was cited in four opinions only once (1983), in three opinions thrice
(1982, 1988, and 1990). Since the end of 1981, when Judge Posner was confirmed,
it has been cited in twenty-three opinions, including six by Posner and four by
other Seventh Circuit judges. No opinion mentioned the phrase "Coase Theo-
rem." Some opinions cited Coase's article only in passing; others mentioned an
aspect of the article tangential to the theorem; all were counted. LEXIS STATES
library, MEGA file, search term "Coase," and then looking for Social Cost in
the original or as republished in R. CoAsE, supra note 11. On the other hand,
Coase has surely affected judicial thinking indirectly, by influencing scholars on
whom courts rely without crediting Coase.
28. See Posin, supra note 8, at 91.
29. See Schwab, supra note 18, at 1173.
30. "Ronald Coase taught us, what of course we should already have
known, that when it is to the benefit of people to reach an agreement, they will
seek to reach it." Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 99 YALE L.J. 631,
631 (1989). Stigler earlier observed that the invariance version of the Coase
Theorem is "extraordinarily nonobvious," and that "the world of zero transaction
costs turns out to be as strange as the physical world would be with zero
friction." Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the
Scholars, I J. LEGAL SnrD. 1, 11-12 (1972). Coase claims his ideas are "so simple
indeed as almost to make their propositions fall into the category of truths which




for a while, sees things from a different perspective, and then
returns to normal sight, not altogether sure what one saw. The
judiciary, our most conservative institution, hesitates to engage in
such a daring exercise.
Even regular users of the Coasean perspective may neglect it.
Such is the suggestion of Professor Donohue, in his marvelously-
titled commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and
Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?31 Ac-
cording to Donohue, the Coase Theorem indicates that rates of
settlement should be unaffected by whether or not parties pay
their own legal expenses (the American rule), yet two leading law
and economics scholars overlooked this Coasean prediction. Reg-
ular wearers, too, may forget their Coasean spectacles.
The counter-intuitive nature of the Coase Theorem, and its
inherent ambiguity, also lead to error in its application. Even Dean
Calabresi felt compelled to correct some of his published thoughts
about the theorem.3 2 Professor Posin, himself a distinguished ac-
ademic who regularly teaches law and economics, also may see
imperfectly when he dons Coasean spectacles. In his Wayne article
he added to the national Coase Theorem debate a new argument,
but, unfortunately, rested his argument principally on a hypothet-
ical with a flawed solution.
If nothing else, the response to Posin's article disproves the
more extreme suggestions that law reviews go unread. Legal aca-
demics participate, in effect, in a continuing symposium in which
they propose, explore, attack, and defend ideas. The vigorous
response to Posin's article belies the charge that the audience for
legal writing is inattentive.
Posin's article affords readers an unusual opportunity to test
their critical faculties while wearing Coasean spectacles. The article
sets forth a hypothetical fact pattern. A detailed analysis of the
scenario concludes that the rancher would raise thirty-nine head
of cattle when liable for trampling the farmer's crops, fifty head
when not.33 Posin now concedes error, recognizing that at least in
the short run the number would be the same either way. Enter-
prising readers should pause here to read, or reread, Posin's article
and try their hands at finding his error. Wearing Coasean spectacles
is always stimulating.
31. 104 HARv. L. Rnv. 1093 (1991).
32. See infra note 57.
33. Posin, supra note 8, at 108-10.
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IV. POSIN'S ERROR
As Posin notes in his response, critics of his solution to the
hypothetical fall into two camps, not counting Malloy, 34 who raises
separate concerns. Currier and Harrison, 35 Heriot, 31 and Ulen37
make essentially the same point, namely, that Posin considered
opportunity costs only when the rancher faced liability, not when
liability was absent. Cohen's discussion of Posin's error is more
cryptic, but he appears to take the same approach.3 8 Although
neither Ulen nor Cohen offers a numerical solution to the hypo-
thetical, they likely would agree with the other papers' conclusion
that the rancher would raise thirty-nine head of cattle whether or
not liability attached. Marks39 and Schwab 4 also focus on Posin's
asymmetric treatment of opportunity costs, but their solution to
Posin's hypothetical is fifty, not thirty-nine. In his response, Posin
agrees that fifty is the correct answer; it seems that Marks and
Schwab better understood the hypothetical as assuming a declining
marginal profit from raising ponies. 41
Even within the two camps the differences in approach are
intriguing. For instance, Marks relies more heavily on mathematics,
and in the process shows the usefulness of marginal analysis.
Schwab uses detailed narrative to accomplish the same purpose.
Crespi sides with those who regard the Coase Theorem as a "simple
(though insightful) definitional tautology," and thus reacted to
Posin's claim the way a mathematician would "to the claim that
2 + 2 = 5. " 42 For different reasons, however, Crespi agrees with
34. Malloy, If Pigs Could Fly Where Would They Go? A Reply to Professor
Posin, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 83 (1991).
35. Currier & Harrison, Pigs With Wings: A Comment on Posin's "Ref-
utation" of the Coase Theorem, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 21 (1991).
36. Heriot, Whether Pigs Have Wings, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 31 (1992). Heriot
includes a nice collection of encomiums to the Coase Theorem. Id. at 31 n.4.
37. Ulen, Flogging a Dead Pig: Professor Posin on the Coase Theorem,
38 WAYNE L. Rnv. 91 (1991).
38. Cohen, On Judging Whether to Publish Articles that Claim to Refute
the Coase Theorem: Analogies to Bayesian Methods, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 15
(1991).
39. Marks, Of Posin and Pigs, of Coase and Cost, of Profits Gained and
Opportunities Lost, 38 WAYN L. REv. 47 (1991).
40. Schwab, Coase, Rents, and Opportunity Costs, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 55
(1991).
41. Posin, supra note 9, at 109 (wryly observing that "my credibility has
been put into question here").
42. Crespi, If Pigs That Could Fly Could Reply: A Response to Daniel
Posin, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 75, 78 (1991).
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Posin that the Coase Theorem is a poor source of policy, and
argues that efficiency-even Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which turns
on whether gains outweigh losses-is an invalid test for policy
choices. Currier and Harrison share Posin's reservations about the
usefulness of the Coase Theorem for resolving policy issues, but
conclude that Posin's hypothetical does not disturb Coase's central
insight, namely, the "reciprocal nature" of the interests of two
intertwined parties.43
V. LARGER IssuEs RAISED BY THE RESPONSES
Several authors use the opportunity of responding to Posin to
address larger issues. Cohen characterizes the publication of Posin's
article as symptomatic of the problems inherent in an academic
publishing system dominated by student-edited law reviews. 4 Stop-
ping short of a what he recognizes would be a quixotic call for a
change to faculty-edited reviews, he urges student editors to consult
outside experts before publishing certain kinds of work.
Two authors enter into more general discussions of law and
economics. Malloy4" leaves to others the task of analyzing whether
Posin applied Coase correctly, arguing that it is unnecessary to
disprove Coase to focus on value choices. He calls for a compar-
ative approach to law and economics, an approach that sees "all
forms of discourse concerning the allocation of scarce resources
and political power as law and economics." 46 Ulen seems to agree
with Malloy that the Coase Theorem should be kept in context,
but Ulen takes a quite different approach. In the closing section
of his paper, Ulen seeks to "repulse" 47 what he perceives as Posin's
attack on the law and economics movement. He makes three
points: (1) Coase, and economists, do not minimize the importance
of value choices; (2) belief in the Coase Theorem is not essential
to productive service in the law and economics vineyard; and (3)
the law and economics movement is a "Big Tent," to borrow a
political phrase not used by Ulen, inhabited by scholars of diverse
43. Currier & Harrison, supra note 35, at 26; see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
44. Cohen thus joins the critics noted supra at note 4.
45. Malloy, If Pigs Could Fly Where Would They Go? A Reply to Professor
Posin, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 83 (1991).
46. Id. at 89.
47. Ulen, supra note 37, at 101.
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views, perspectives, and expertise. 4 In short, scholars can address
values and promote liberal agendas without slaying Coase, and,
anyway, slaying Coase would not do any good.
Earlier in his paper Ulen explains that Posin's solution to the
hypothetical, even if correct, would invalidate only the "invariance
thesis" of the Coase Theorem, not the "efficiency thesis. ' 49 Schwab
makes the same point.50 Ulen employs Edgeworth Box diagrams
to show that although zero transactions costs will lead to efficient
allocations of resources-in his view "the standard interpretation
of the Coase Theorem"-only in "atypical" cases will the allo-
cation of resources be unaffected by liability rules. 51 Schwab agrees
that Posin's hypothetical, even with his solution, would leave
untouched the "efficiency thesis.''52 He makes this point as part
of an attempt "to make a silk purse out of this fallen sow's ear ' 53
by using Posin's work to raise several interesting points about the
Coase Theorem. Schwab offers a lucid explanation of how strategic
bargaining and the "wealth effect" can limit the applicability of
the Coase Theorem.54 Finally, and here controversy continues,
Schwab explains why he believes a changed legal rule can increase
or decrease a rancher's profitability without changing behavior as
a producer-although as a consumer, the rancher "is more likely
to buy a Cadillac when the legal rule suddenly favors her." '55
Here Posin takes a stand. He responds that if ranching becomes
less profitable, the rancher will shift resources into other enter-
48. Building on his theme of the inevitable misunderstandings between
different cultures, Ulen recalls surprising questions about United States social
customs put to him by some Chinese. Ulen, supra note 37, at 103 n.26. Reading
this account reminded me of the Dutch secretary who innocently asked the visiting
American professor: "Is it true that all Americans are fat?"
Ulen is too modest to observe that he has contributed to relaxing the linkage
between law and economics and conservatism by publishing an alternative to
Posner's text. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988). For this
observation and another celebration of the Big Tent of law and economics, see
Donohue, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 L. & Soc'y REv. 903,
920 (1988).
49. Ulen, supra note 37, at 92. Ulen colorfully points out that, as noted
above, there are multiple interpretations of the Coase Theorem. Id. at 91 n.4.
50. Schwab, supra note 40, at 64-65.
51. Ulen, supra note 37, at 101.
52. Schwab, supra note 40, at 64-65.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. at 65-66.




prises. This "will lead to changes in the number of cattle run,"
which shows that the "Coase Theorem is in error. ' 56 Schwab had
reasoned that a change in liability rules would affect the value of
the rancher's land, but the land's cost is a sunk cost that does




This introduction ends where it began, with a disagreement. If
nothing else, Posin's article freshened the debate about the Coase
Theorem. That debate is unlikely to end here, for the scroll that
is the Coase Theorem is in the public domain, and only uninhibited,
vigorous examination of it will satisfy its foes and its champions.
56. Posin, supra note 9, at 13. In making this argument Posin relies in
part on Ulen's Edgeworth Boxes to show that in what Ulen called the atypical
case which satisfies the invariance thesis, profits would differ depending on
assignment of liability. Posin disagrees with Ulen about whether such a case is
atypical, however, arguing that this will be common when producers have
intersecting interests. Id. at 4-5.
57. Disagreement about rate-of-return analysis and the Coase Theorem has
a long history, occurring, most notably, between Dean Calabresi and himself.
See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 H~Av. L. REV. 713, 730 n.28, 731 n.31 (1965) (changed liability
rules affect rate of return, which will affect long-run resource use), corrected,
Calabresi, supra note 19, at 67-68 ("the same type of transactions which cured
the short run misallocation would also occur to cure the long run ones"). Schwab
and Posin disagree with unusual asperity, accusing each other of reasoning like
an accountant rather than an economist. (The venerable accounting profession
must cringe to hear the term "accountant" used as an epithet!) The reader can
decide which, Posin or Schwab, deserves the apparently more honored title of
economist. For what it is worth, Schwab is the one with the Ph.D. (Posin has
an M.A.)-but then, Richard Posner, the revered Pied Piper of law and econom-
ics, holds neither.
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